Research Interests
Feminist Epistemology: epistemic injustice, epistemic agency and communities
Philosophy of Psychology: stereotypes, bias, social and self-identity
Philosophy of Science: objectivity, values in science
Current Projects
(working title) Not Knowing Things, Together: Ignorance, Misinformation, and Social Epistemology
This book analyzes phenomena such as conspiracy theories, cults, scams, and echo chambers that draws from sociology & psychology, philosophy of science, and feminist epistemology. I argue that many everyday and academic discussions of these topics focus too much on individual blame and vice. I propose an account that focuses on how epistemic communities (especially with unjust power dynamics) develop hard-to-notice flaws. My plan is to publish this as a book for both an academic and non-academic audience—as both an empirically-informed feminist reflection on misinformation in the twenty-first century and as a primer for how to talk to people that you think have fallen into these epistemic traps (and as a nudging to readers to reflect on whether they’ve stumbled into them as times, too.)
Tentative Chapter Titles:
“How Would I Know If I Were In A Cult?”
“Does It Take a Village to Defeat a Scam?”
“How to Cheat An Honest Woman: MLM Companies and Gender”
“What D&D and Escape Rooms Teach Us About Conspiracy Theories”
“The Epistemic Virtue of ‘Gullibility’, or, Why I Hate April Fools’ Day”
“If That Were True, I Would Have Heard It By Now: Active Ignorance & Epistemic Isolation”
“Lie to Me: Movies, Scientific Inaccuracies, and Audiences’ Social Imaginary”
“Research Before You Post: Epistemic Due Diligence in the Internet Age”
“Common Sense, Confirmation Bias, & The Value of Friends That Call Us on Our BS”
This book analyzes phenomena such as conspiracy theories, cults, scams, and echo chambers that draws from sociology & psychology, philosophy of science, and feminist epistemology. I argue that many everyday and academic discussions of these topics focus too much on individual blame and vice. I propose an account that focuses on how epistemic communities (especially with unjust power dynamics) develop hard-to-notice flaws. My plan is to publish this as a book for both an academic and non-academic audience—as both an empirically-informed feminist reflection on misinformation in the twenty-first century and as a primer for how to talk to people that you think have fallen into these epistemic traps (and as a nudging to readers to reflect on whether they’ve stumbled into them as times, too.)
Tentative Chapter Titles:
“How Would I Know If I Were In A Cult?”
“Does It Take a Village to Defeat a Scam?”
“How to Cheat An Honest Woman: MLM Companies and Gender”
“What D&D and Escape Rooms Teach Us About Conspiracy Theories”
“The Epistemic Virtue of ‘Gullibility’, or, Why I Hate April Fools’ Day”
“If That Were True, I Would Have Heard It By Now: Active Ignorance & Epistemic Isolation”
“Lie to Me: Movies, Scientific Inaccuracies, and Audiences’ Social Imaginary”
“Research Before You Post: Epistemic Due Diligence in the Internet Age”
“Common Sense, Confirmation Bias, & The Value of Friends That Call Us on Our BS”
Edited Books
Overcoming Epistemic Injustice: Social and Psychological Perspectives. Co-edited with Benjamin Sherman. Rowman & Littlefield. 2019.
The chapters collected in this book share a common motivation: all respond to certain kinds of injustice, and, more specifically, kinds of injustice that unfairly and unreasonably prevent the insights and intellectual abilities of vulnerable and stigmatized groups from being given their due recognition. These kinds of injustice are, of course, very old, even if their specific forms change over time, and talk in terms of “epistemic injustice” is new. [...] This collection is organized about two concerns that are already widespread in the literature, but are not always a focus. First, the chapters in this collection are interested in how we can do better. [...] Second, the chapters in this collection deal, at some level or another, with empirical research, to better understand what goes wrong, and how to improve.
The chapters collected in this book share a common motivation: all respond to certain kinds of injustice, and, more specifically, kinds of injustice that unfairly and unreasonably prevent the insights and intellectual abilities of vulnerable and stigmatized groups from being given their due recognition. These kinds of injustice are, of course, very old, even if their specific forms change over time, and talk in terms of “epistemic injustice” is new. [...] This collection is organized about two concerns that are already widespread in the literature, but are not always a focus. First, the chapters in this collection are interested in how we can do better. [...] Second, the chapters in this collection deal, at some level or another, with empirical research, to better understand what goes wrong, and how to improve.
Papers & Chapters
"Positive Stereotypes: Unexpected Allies or Devil's Bargain?"
in Overcoming Epistemic Injustice. Benjamin Sherman and Stacey Goguen, eds. Rowman & Littlefield. 2019.
This paper argues both that positive stereotypes have unacknowledged potential for doing good, but also further harms and contributions to epistemic injustice that are not easily revealed in analyses of negative stereotypes.
in Overcoming Epistemic Injustice. Benjamin Sherman and Stacey Goguen, eds. Rowman & Littlefield. 2019.
This paper argues both that positive stereotypes have unacknowledged potential for doing good, but also further harms and contributions to epistemic injustice that are not easily revealed in analyses of negative stereotypes.
"Is Asking What Women Want the Right Question? Underrepresentation in philosophy and gender differences in interests"
Dialogue, 57(2): 409-441. 2018.
This paper analyzes debates in philosophy and STEM about possible gendered differences in interests. I argue that, although the subject has merit, many people are not aware of the ways that stereotypes can influence our interests and identities. As a result, if there are gendered differences in interests regarding philosophy, the default hypothesis should not be, as many have stated and implied, that these differences are “natural” or “likely harmless, ”or “fixed.”
Dialogue, 57(2): 409-441. 2018.
This paper analyzes debates in philosophy and STEM about possible gendered differences in interests. I argue that, although the subject has merit, many people are not aware of the ways that stereotypes can influence our interests and identities. As a result, if there are gendered differences in interests regarding philosophy, the default hypothesis should not be, as many have stated and implied, that these differences are “natural” or “likely harmless, ”or “fixed.”
“Stereotype Threat, Epistemic Injustice, and Rationality”
in Implicit Bias and Philosophy. Michael Brownstein and Jennifer Saul, eds. Oxford University Press. 2016.
This paper argues that stereotype threat has a complicated role to play as a catalyst for epistemic injustice, especially for stereotypes about a person’s rationality.
in Implicit Bias and Philosophy. Michael Brownstein and Jennifer Saul, eds. Oxford University Press. 2016.
This paper argues that stereotype threat has a complicated role to play as a catalyst for epistemic injustice, especially for stereotypes about a person’s rationality.
Dissertation
“Stereotype Threat, Epistemic Agency, and Self-Identity.” Boston University. 2016.
My dissertation is on stereotype-threat, which is a kind of anxious awareness about well-known cultural stereotypes. I argue that, although the vast majority of scientific research focuses on and defines stereotype threat around its effects on performance, a more theoretically core part of the phenomenon is its underexplored effects on self-identity. In short: a stereotype that you don’t believe is true can still exert an influence on how you view yourself.
My dissertation is on stereotype-threat, which is a kind of anxious awareness about well-known cultural stereotypes. I argue that, although the vast majority of scientific research focuses on and defines stereotype threat around its effects on performance, a more theoretically core part of the phenomenon is its underexplored effects on self-identity. In short: a stereotype that you don’t believe is true can still exert an influence on how you view yourself.
Recent Talks
“Whose Science? Whose Knowledge”
Invited talk on Sandra Harding’s work in philosophy of science. University of Illinois Chicago Postdoctoral Associate, International Women’s Day. 2020
Invited talk on Sandra Harding’s work in philosophy of science. University of Illinois Chicago Postdoctoral Associate, International Women’s Day. 2020
“Trans Youth Panics as Hermeneutical Counterinsurgency.”
Co-presented with B. R. George (Carnegie Mellon University). Central APA Meeting, Chicago, IL. 2019
Co-presented with B. R. George (Carnegie Mellon University). Central APA Meeting, Chicago, IL. 2019
“Ignorance & the Ethics of Philosophy News.”
Invited talk for Boston University MAP (Minorities and Philosophy) chapter. 2019
Invited talk for Boston University MAP (Minorities and Philosophy) chapter. 2019
“Positive Stereotypes: Unexpected Allies or Devil’s Bargain?”
The Prindle Institute Applied Epistemology Research Retreat and Workshop. Depauw University. 2018
The Prindle Institute Applied Epistemology Research Retreat and Workshop. Depauw University. 2018
“Overcoming Stereotypes: What is the goal?”
Eastern APA Meeting. 2018
Eastern APA Meeting. 2018
“The Paradox of Human Personhood”
Mentoring Workshop for Pre-Tenure Women in Philosophy. Salt Lake City. 2017
Mentoring Workshop for Pre-Tenure Women in Philosophy. Salt Lake City. 2017
“Why Asking What Women Want Is the Wrong Question: Determining the Ideal Number of Women in Philosophy”
Eastern APA Meeting. 2017 | CSWIP. Mount Allison University. 2016
Eastern APA Meeting. 2017 | CSWIP. Mount Allison University. 2016
“Expanding Our Picture of Stereotype Threat”
Minds Online Conference. Brains Blog. 2016
Minds Online Conference. Brains Blog. 2016
“Stereotype Threat, Stress, and Desire”
Doing the Body in the 21st Century Conference. University of Pittsburgh, Gender, Sexuality, & Women’s Studies Program. 2016
Doing the Body in the 21st Century Conference. University of Pittsburgh, Gender, Sexuality, & Women’s Studies Program. 2016
“Feminist Epistemology in Social Psychology”
Hypatia Conference: Exploring Collaborative Contestations and Diversifying Philosophy. Villanova University. 2015
Hypatia Conference: Exploring Collaborative Contestations and Diversifying Philosophy. Villanova University. 2015
“Scientific Objectivity is Reducible”
Values in Medicine, Science, and Technology Conference. The University of Texas at Dallas. 2014
Values in Medicine, Science, and Technology Conference. The University of Texas at Dallas. 2014
